A Phenomenological 4E Eliminative Materialism: Consciousness as Neuromuscular Adaptation “In Virtue of Which” Movement Affordances are Disclosed

Authors

10.5281/zenodo.15004005

Abstract

Traditional eliminative materialism has argued that folk-psychological constructs such as belief, desire, or sensation do not correspond to scientifically-real entities. However, eliminativist writing discourse has mostly focused on a purely brain-centered model, with limited clarity on how bodily and environmental factors fit into an ontologically radical perception of the mind. This paper proposes a phenomenological 4E eliminative materialism, drawing on both Rowlands’ arguments for extended, embodied cognition as well as my own focus on neuromuscular adaptation as the basis of consciousness. I argue that “consciousness” should be understood not as mental content but as a fully material phenomenon, realized in the evolving, body-plus-environment synergy “in virtue of which” affordances are disclosed. This perspective dissolves the distinction between “mind” and “body” and even between “brain” and the “rest of the body,” as all cognitive processes rely on bodily structures beyond the brain. The novelty is twofold: (1) consciousness is not “that of which” we are aware, but “that in virtue of which” world-directed actions and perceptions emerge, physically constituted by new neuromuscular dispositions stemming from repeated engagement; and (2) this integrative approach fully eliminates talk of “mental states,” demonstrating that all cognition—and therefore all consciousness—extends beyond the brain. In doing so, it strengthens responses to common eliminativist objections, including self-refutation, by obviating the need for an internal “belief state” behind actions or assertions.

Keywords:

cognition, consciousness, eliminative materialism, mind, body, brain

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Metrics

Metrics Loading ...

References

Brooks R. Intelligence without representation. Artif Intell 1991;47:139–59.

Chemero A. Radical embodied cognitive science. MIT Press; 2009.

Churchland PM. Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. J Philos 1981;78:67–90.

Churchland PM. Evaluating our self conception. Mind Lang 1993;8(2):211–22.

Cornman J. On the elimination of “sensations” and sensations. Rev Metaphys 1968;26:15–35.

Dennett D. Why you can’t make a computer that feels pain. In: Brainstorms. MIT Press; 1978:190–229.

Dennett D. Quining qualia. In: Marcel A, Bisiach E, editors. Consciousness in contemporary science. Oxford University Press; 1988:42–77.

Feyerabend P. Mental events and the brain. J Philos 1963;40:295–6.

Frankish K. Illusionism as a theory of consciousness. J Conscious Stud 2016;23:11–39.

Horgan T, Woodward J. Folk psychology is here to stay. Philos Rev 1985;94:197–226.

Leyva A. Embodied Rilkean sport-specific knowledge. J Philos Sport 2018;45(2):128–43.

Leyva A. A phenomenological and physiological approach to embodied Rilkean sport-specific perception. Sport Ethics Philos 2018.

Leyva A. (User’s stance on neuromuscular adaptation—unpublished or references as per user’s specification.) 2021.

Lycan W, Pappas G. What is eliminative materialism? Australas J Philos 1972;50:149–59.

Quine WVO. Word and object. MIT Press; 1960.

Ramsey W. Was Rorty an eliminative materialist? In: Malachowski A, editor. The Wiley Blackwell companion to Rorty. Wiley Blackwell; 2020.

Rorty R. Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories. Rev Metaphys 1965;19:24–54.

Rowlands M. Against methodological solipsism: the ecological approach. Philos Psychol 1995;8:5–24.

Rowlands M. The body in mind: understanding cognitive processes. Cambridge University Press; 1999.

Rowlands M. Body language: representation in action. MIT Press; 2006.

Rowlands M. The new science of the mind: from extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press; 2010.

Rowlands M. Bringing philosophy back: 4E cognition and the argument from phenomenology. In: Dahlstrom D, Elpidorou A, Hopp W, editors. Philosophy of mind and phenomenology: conceptual and empirical approaches. Routledge; 2015:55–77.

Rowlands M. Consciousness unbound. J Conscious Stud 2015;22(3–4):34–51.

Uchida Y, et al. Dynamic visual acuity in baseball players is due to superior tracking abilities. Med Sci Sports Exerc 2013;45(2):319–25. (Cited as an empirical context in Leyva 2018.)

Downloads

Published

11.03.2025

How to Cite

Leyva Pizano, A. (2025). A Phenomenological 4E Eliminative Materialism: Consciousness as Neuromuscular Adaptation “In Virtue of Which” Movement Affordances are Disclosed. Journal of NeuroPhilosophy, 4(1). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15004005