Demystifying Consciousness and Non-cognitive Theories of Consciousness
Abstract
In “A conceptual framework for consciousness,” Michael Graziano provides a substantive conceptual framework for explaining consciousness. In this commentary I will focus on the way Graziano sets up the issue, which fails to capture the opposition accurately. The opponent of Graziano’s approach is no mysticism, but non-cognitive theories exemplified by, e.g., Ned Block’s Overflow thesis. Without identifying the opponent accurately, its significance cannot be fully appreciated. In this commentary I attempt to capture the real disagreement to facilitate further communications.
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Block, N. Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2007;30(5-6): 481-548.
Block, N. Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access. Trends in Cognitive Science 2011; 15(12): 567-575.
Block, N. If perception is probabilistic, why doesn’t it seem probabilistic? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 2018; 373.: #1755.
Carruthers, P. A metacognitive model of the sense of agency over thoughts. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 2012; 17: 291-314.
Chalmers, D. Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1995; 2: 200-219.
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Copyright (c) 2022 Tony Cheng

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