Herzog’s Cartesian Theater: Skepticism, Self, and Stories in Theater of Thought

Abstract

This essay draws out some philosophical dimensions of Werner Herzog’s recent film Theater of Thought, which interweaves an overview of contemporary neurotechnology development with consideration of classical problems in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Over the course of the film, Herzog increasingly concerns himself with the challenge of philosophical skepticism. This preoccupation is framed as arising from his encounters, via certain of his scientist interviewees, with an outlook that I here term neuroscientific postmodernism. According to this outlook, modern neuroscience overturns our ordinary conception of ourselves as active, unified, conscious subjects of experience, and in so doing problematizes the application of the very concept of truth to the stories we tell about ourselves. As I interpret him, Herzog implicitly challenges this outlook on several fronts. His alternative emphasizes human spontaneity as it arises in everyday activities unmediated by digital technology, a reverential attitude toward consciousness and the mystery it presents, and a potential response to skepticism that invites comparison with those of Samuel Johnson, G.E. Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and O.K. Bouwsma.