Why You Can Never Be Me: Toward an Ontological Mechanism for the Irreplicability of the First-Person Experience
Abstract
This paper explores the source of the inherent uniqueness of first-person perspectives (FPPs), the subjective lens through which individuals experience the world. While much research has focused on universal aspects of consciousness, the distinctiveness of individual experience remains underexplored. It is proposed that FPPs are not merely emergent properties of the brain but may be fundamentally tied to the structure of reality itself. By examining biological, quantum, and ontological frameworks, it is argued that only an ontological basis—specifically, the unique coordinates of the spacetime continuum—can guarantee the absolute uniqueness of FPPs. Biological and quantum processes, while contributing to statistical uniqueness, cannot ensure irreplicability. The paper synthesizes ideas from neuroscience, quantum mechanics, and philosophy to present a cohesive framework, suggesting that consciousness and FPPs may emerge from the fabric of spacetime. This speculative yet structured approach aims to provide new avenues for understanding the origins of individuality in conscious experience and to inspire interdisciplinary research into the nature of consciousness.
Keywords:
Consciousness, ontology, quantum, spacetime, uniqueness, brainDownloads
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References
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Copyright (c) 2025 George Goutos

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