Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy – What Is It and How It Can Contribute To Philosophy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6637657Abstract
What is neurophilosophy? Different variants of connecting neuroscience and philosophy emerged in recent years. Besides reductive, parallelistic, and neurophenomenological variants, we here focus on Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy (NRNP) as introduced by the author of this paper. NRNP can methodologically be characterized by the inclusion of multiple domains (ontological, epistemological, empirical, etc.) and various methodological strategies (like logical-conceptual and observational-experimental) – this amounts to domain pluralism and method pluralism. That is combined with an iterative methodological movement between the different domains and, specifically conceptual and empirical domains resulting in concept-fact iterativity. Such non-reductive neurophilosophical approach can make major contributions to both neuroscience and philosophy. Concerning the latter, we demonstrate how a non-reductive neurophilosophical approach allows taking into view a deeper neuro-ecological and spatiotemporal layer of Martin Heidegger’s Fundamental ontology and its “being in the world”. This may also require a more fundamental approach to consciousness in both its phenomenological features and neural basis – this has recently been proposed in the “Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness” (TTC). In sum, due to its particular methodological strategy, NRNP allows providing a broader more comprehensive framework to philosophical problems like subjectivity, consciousness, and mind-body problem (and various others). Moreover, NRNP may provide a novel deeper framing and reading of historical authors (like Kant, Heidegger, Whitehead, etc.) which may allow to connect them to current and systematic philosophical and even neuroscientific issues.
Keywords:
neurophilosophy, neurophenomenology, Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy, Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness, mind-body problem, Merleau-PontyDownloads
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