Freedom under Naturalistic Dualism by Arturo Macías
This article explores the concept of freedom within the framework of naturalistic dualism, a philosophical system that combines physicalism, subjectivism, and epiphenomenalism. According to physicalism, the evolution of the Universe at all scales is fully determined by the mechanical laws governing elementary particles and fields, whether these laws are deterministic or stochastic, thereby reducing reality to mere chance and necessity. In contrast, consciousness is immediately real, and since Descartes, subjective experience has been the foundation of philosophical inquiry. To address the tension between physicalism and subjectivism, epiphenomenalism suggests that matter evolves autonomously and determines consciousness.
We propose replacing the classic Chalmers’ “zombie conceivability” argument with the “Laplace’s demon consciousness blindness” as the foundation of naturalistic dualism. The fact that an intellect with a perfect phenomenal understanding of reality is unable to assess consciousness implies dualism more straightforwardly than conceivability arguments do. On the other hand, we point out that if consciousness plays any role in the laws of physics (as subjective quantum wave collapse theories affirm), then epiphenomenalism could potentially be falsified.
Regarding freedom, in this article it is postulated that it is a legitimate concept: by evaluating the set of possible futures conditional on their actions, a conscious subject constructs a mental object that defines the scope of their “freedom.” If agency is the “power to act,” then a conscious being who can choose among several options possesses this power, regardless of how determined the use of that power may be, vindicating Schopenhauerian free will.
A crucial observation about freedom is its relationship with time: in our Universe (where the past is remembered and the future unknown) freedom is always oriented towards the future. From a philosophical standpoint the physical basis of time asymmetry is a significant unresolved issue in Physics, and we conjecture that it is linked to the existence of ontic randomness in the fundamental laws of Physics.
Our definition of freedom addresses the liberty-responsibility dyad: the abhorrence that evil deeds produce is justified in absence of causative agency because they signal an unworthy conscious perpetrator. In the moral realm, when a conscious being commits an immoral act, our condemnation arises not merely from the social desirability of punishment but from the horror that a conscious being is capable of such acts.
The existence of consciousness imparts moral relevance to physical systems. To some extent, this allows for the metaphysical grounding of moral reciprocity: an immoral conscious subject excludes themselves, to the degree of their immorality, from the moral circle to which their own conscience grants them access.
